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ABSTRACT 
The United States federal government’s attempts to curb 
Internet gambling are beginning to resemble a game of whack-a-
mole.  The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 
(the “UIGEA” or “Act”) represents its most recent attack on 
Internet gambling.  This iBrief first looks at U.S. attempts to limit 
Internet gambling and how those efforts have affected gambling 
law and business.  It then discusses how the UIGEA works and 
highlights some of its major limitations.  This iBrief argues that the 
UIGEA will not only fail to rein in online gambling, but that the 
U.S. federal government is treading an improvident course towards 
prohibition and will undermine U.S. policy concerns.  Finally, this 
piece concludes by recommending that the U.S. abandon its current 
course and regulate online gambling. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 In 2005, approximately fifteen to twenty million United States 
(“U.S.”) gamblers placed bets online.2  The U.S. online gambling market 
was estimated at six billion dollars, representing half of the world’s online 
gambling revenues.3  At the same time, the U.S. government has been the 
world’s staunchest opponent of online gambling.4  Under both the Clinton 
and Bush administrations, the Department of Justice has fought its growth.5  
                                                     
1 B.A., Economics, Yale University, 2002; J.D. Candidate, Duke University School 
of Law, 2008. 
2 Radely Balko, Online Gambling Ban a Bad Bet for Republicans, 
FOXNEWS.COM, Oct. 23, 2006, 
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,224157,00.html. 
3 Associated Press, Experts: Online-Gambling Ban Won’t Work, 
FOXNEWS.COM, Oct. 25, 2006, 
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,224839,00.html 
[hereinafter Experts on Ban]. 
4 See, e.g., id. 
5 See Megan E. Frese, Note, Rolling The Dice: Are Online Gambling Advertisers 
“Aiding and Abetting” Criminal Activity or Exercising First Amendment-
Protected Free Speech?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 547, 
612 (2005). 
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Additionally, legislators have spent the better part of a decade attempting to 
enact anti-Internet gambling laws.6 
¶2 On October 13, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law 
the UIGEA.7  Senator Bill Frist (R-Tenn) attached the legislation to an 
unrelated port-security bill just moments before it was voted on.8  The 
UIGEA’s unexpected enactment created industry hysteria.9  Stock prices of 
publicly-traded e-casinos10 plummeted, wiping out over approximately 
seven billion dollars of market value.11  Some of the most prominent e-
casinos pulled out of the U.S. market entirely.12  Since then, the mass media 
has churned out wide-ranging commentary on the Act; from complete 
dismissals of its viability to comparisons with Prohibition.13 
¶3 This iBrief is divided into three parts.  Part one traces the 
development of Internet gambling law.  Part two analyzes the UIGEA, 
discussing its function and highlighting some of its major limitations.  Part 
three discusses the implications of the Act; arguing that the Act will push 
online gambling further underground and, in so doing, undermine U.S 
policy concerns.  The iBrief concludes by recommending a better way for 
the US to regulate online gambling.  Importantly, this piece makes a wide-
ranging examination of a broad legal landscape.  It simply touches upon 
complex legal issues that may call for more in-depth treatment.  Rather than 
resolve all of these questions, the author’s goal here is merely to illustrate 
an imprudent U.S. policy by examining the various components involved. 
I.  INTERNET GAMBLING PRE-ACT 
A. Gambling Online 
¶4 An internet user, or “gamer,” can participate in various gambling 
activities in a virtual environment (“e-casino”).  For example, one can bet 
                                                     
6 Id. at 557-59. 
7 Eric Pfanner & Heather Timmons, U.K. Seeks Global Rules for Online 
Gambling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/iht/2006/11/02/technology/IHT-02gamble.html. 
8  Nelson Rose, Congress Makes Sausages, 11 GAMING L. REV. 1 (2007). 
9 See Experts on Ban, supra note 3. 
10 The author uses the term “e-casino” in reference to gambling websites of all 
types, or operators thereof. 
11 Pfanner & Timmons, supra note 7. 
12 See id. 
13 See, e.g., George F. Will, Prohibition II: Good Grief, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 
2006, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/72444; Allyn Jaffrey Shulman, 
Legal Landscape of Online Gaming Has Not Changed, CARDPLAYER.COM, Oct. 
5, 2006, www.cardplayer.com/poker_news/article/3272. 
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on sports, horseracing, and casino-style games.14  A gamer can even 
participate in real-time poker tournaments with players from around the 
world.15 
¶5 In order to gamble online, the user must download the proper 
software from the e-casino’s website onto his/her personal computer.16  The 
user then creates a personal account providing her name, home address, a 
valid e-mail address, date of birth and other personal information.17  The 
user then accesses the e-casino’s virtual “lobby” wherein she must set up an 
electronic cash account from which wagers will be drawn and in which 
winnings will be deposited.18 
¶6 Among various account-funding alternatives, such as personal 
checks and credit cards, U.S. gamblers primarily use e-wallets.19  An e-
wallet is an online account in which money can be deposited and used in 
commercial transactions.20  The e-wallet drafts on a consumer’s bank, credit 
card or debit account and routes the funds to the merchant; in this case, an 
e-casino.  However, these funds can also be used in transactions unrelated to 
gambling.21  The most widely used e-wallets facilitate billions of dollars in 
commerce annually, and are based and regulated offshore.22  Once a player 
has set up and funded her e-wallet, it is time for the games to begin. 
                                                     
14 E.g., BoDog, http://www.bodoglife.com/poker/. (last visited Apr. 12, 2008). 
15 Id. 
16 In the strict interest of research, the author set up accounts with three separate 
e-casinos in order to formulate general guidelines for setting up an online 
gambling account.  BoDog, http://www.bodoglife.com/poker/ (last visited Apr. 
12, 2008); PokerStars, http://www.PokerStars.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2008); 
Doyles Room, http://www.Doylesroom.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2008). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Michael Clarke, Card Clampdown On Gamblers, THISISMONEY, Mar. 21, 
2006, http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/credit-and- 
loans/article.html?in_article_id=407775&in_page_id=9. 
20 See Chuck Humphrey, New Online Gambling Funding Prohibition Law, 
GAMBLING-LAW-US, Sept. 30, 2006, http://www.gambling-law-
us.com/Articles-Notes/specific-points-UIEGA.htm; see also DuluthPoker.com, 
http://www.duluthpoker.com/deposit-options/. (last visited Apr. 12, 2008). 
21 See id. 
22 Aaron Todd, NETeller Exit Impacts U.S. Internet Gambling Market, 
ONLINECASINOCITY, Jan. 18, 2007, 
http://online.casinocity.com/news/news.cfm?ArticleId=70015. 
2008 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 5 
B. The Legal Framework of Internet Gambling  
¶7 Historically, gambling regulation has primarily been left to the 
states.  Accordingly, gambling laws vary widely from state to state.23  For 
example, while Utah completely outlaws gambling, it’s neighbor, Nevada, 
hosts a plethora of gaming attractions.24  While there are several federal 
gambling laws, most are designed to support state law in the face of 
interstate or international gambling.25  In general, liability under federal 
gambling statutes is triggered when the gambling activity has violated an 
underlying state law.26  Only fairly recently has Congress taken a more 
assertive role, legislating over specific forms of gambling, such as sports, 
horseracing, and lotteries.27 
¶8 Despite the Internet’s novelty, pre-existing federal law has proven 
adequate to prosecute offshore e-casino operators, but only in limited 
circumstances.  For example, while courts have found online sports 
gambling to be impermissible under the Wire Act, 28 there is no federal law 
explicitly outlawing online poker.29  The Wire Act essentially prohibits 
businesses from engaging in the transmission of sports bets or wagers over 
the telephone or other wired devices in jurisdictions where such activity is 
illegal.30  As a result, law-makers have attempted to expand legislation to 
deal explicitly with all forms of Internet gambling.31 
                                                     
23 See, e.g., Bruce P. Keller, The Game’s the Same: Why Gambling in 
Cyberspace Violates Federal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1576 (1999). 
24 Id. 
25 Charles Doyle, INTERNET GAMBLING: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 
(Cong. Res. Service, Nov. 29, 2004). 
26 See id. 
27 Jeffrey R. Rodefer, Internet Gambling in Nevada: Overview of Federal Law 
Affecting Assembly Bill 466, at 8, 23–29 (2001), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20040303190351/http:/ag.state.nv.us/hottopics/int_g
amb_nv.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2008). 
28 See generally, U.S. v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d. Cir. 2001).  In U.S. v. Cohen, 
the DOJ successfully prosecuted Jay Cohen, the founder of a multi-million 
dollar online sports book based in Antigua.  During a trip to the U.S., Cohen was 
arrested at the John F. Kennedy Airport and charged with violating the Wire Act 
of 1961.  In holding against Cohen, the court assumed that the nature of the 
wires used to transmit the bets was irrelevant.  See id. at 76; see also 18 U.S.C. § 
1804 (2006). 
29 See Schulman, supra note 13. 
30 See 18 U.S.C. § 1084. 
31 See infra Part I.C. 
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¶9 Over the past decade, the federal government has articulated four 
major policy concerns with Internet gambling. 32  First, the Internet provides 
easy access to gambling, which “could exacerbate the temptations facing 
compulsive gamblers.”33  Second, whereas a gambler’s age can be 
physically examined at a traditional brick-and-mortar casino, it is much 
more difficult to verify the gambler’s age online.34  Third, due to the lack of 
regulation of the online gambling industry, e-casinos have an incentive to 
defraud gamblers; either by rigging the odds to favor the e-casino or by 
outright theft of bets.35  Fourth, given the “volume, speed, and international 
reach of Internet transactions and offshore locations of [e-casinos]” in 
addition to the “high level of anonymity” enjoyed by e-casino operators, 
federal officials believe that online gambling is uniquely susceptible to 
money laundering.36  These four issues underlie the federal government’s 
approach towards online gambling. 
C. Early Government Action 
¶10 Beginning in the mid-90s, several bills were introduced in Congress 
to crack down on Internet gambling.37  One such bill would have amended 
the Wire Act to expressly ban all forms of Internet gambling.38  Other bills 
focused on preventing credit card companies and other financial institutions 
from transferring money in connection with gambling deemed unlawful 
under existing federal or state law.39  The bills were defeated largely 
because of disputes over whether interactive interstate horseracing and 
interactive state lotteries—huge lobbying interests—would be exempt.40 
¶11 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) also took a hard stance against 
online gambling, relying primarily on a questionable theory that the Wire 
                                                     
32 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNET GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
ISSUES, 1–2 (Rep. No. GAO-03089) (2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0389.pdf. 
33 The “Internet Gambling Prohibition Act”: Hearing on H.R. 4777 Before the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrpros, amd 
Homeland Security., 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Ohr Statement] (statement 
of Bruce G. Ohr, Chief of Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, U.S. 
Dept. of Justice). 
34 Id at 3. 
35 See id. at 3–4. 
36 Id. at 4. 
37 See Rodefer, supra note 27, at 34–35. 
38 See id. at 36 (“The Internet Gambling Prohibition Act in 1997 and 1999 . . . 
sought an outright federal ban on e-gaming . . . .”). 
39 See id. at 34–35. 
40 See Joseph J. McBurney, Note & Comment, To Regulate or to Prohibit: An 
Analysis of the Internet Gambling Industry and the Need for a Decision on the 
Industry’s Future in the United States, 21 CONN. J. INT’L L. 337, 348–49 (2006). 
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Act, as originally enacted in 1961, criminalized all forms of Internet 
gambling.41  In 2003, the DOJ issued letters to the National Association of 
Broadcasters and other media groups advising that providing advertising for 
e-casinos may be considered aiding or abetting illegal gambling 
operations.42  Months later, dozens of major media companies were issued 
subpoenas.43 
¶12 The DOJ managed to upset multi-million dollar advertising deals 
between media outlets and e-casinos, and, with little more than legal 
posturing, collected millions in fines and settlements.44  Initially, media 
companies were not willing litigate the matter.45  But in August of 2004, 
Casino City, the largest website devoted to online gambling, sued the DOJ 
on First Amendment grounds to establish its right to accept advertisements 
for Internet gambling.46  The court dismissed the case on the basis that 
Casino City lacked standing as it had neither received a cease-and-desist 
letter nor a subpoena from the DOJ.47  Although the case was dismissed on 
appeal, 48 Casino City reportedly never was issued a subpoena thereafter. 
¶13 Significantly, there are apparently no cases in which the DOJ 
prosecuted a lawsuit against a media company on charges related to online 
gambling advertising.49  Eventually, the online gambling industry 
established a circumvention and advertisements resurfaced on prominent 
media outlets.50  Rather than advertise an e-casino’s dot-com site, where a 
customer could gamble for real money, advertisers now promoted the e-
casino’s dot-net sister-site, where gambling for real money was not 
available, and which had hyperlinks to the dot-com site.51  The media outlet 
                                                     
41 See Ohr Statement, supra note 33 at 3. 
42 Frese, supra note 5, at 554. 
43 Id. at 555. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 Id. at 550. 
47  Spencer E. Ante, Casino City Is Upping Its Bet, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 18, 
2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2005/tc20050218_1299_t
c024.htm (last visited Apr. 12. 2008). 
48 Chuck Humphrey, Advertising Internet Gambling, GAMBLING-LAW-US, Feb. 
27, 2005, http://www.gambling-law-us.com/Articles-Notes/advertising-online-
casinos.htm. 
49 See Joseph Lewczack, Safe Bet?, PROMO MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 2006, 
http://promomagazine.com/legal/marketing_safe_bet/ (last visited Apr. 12, 
2008). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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was now technically advertising non-gambling activity and advertising for 
online gambling became ubiquitous once more.52 
1. In Re MasterCard and The Wire Act 
¶14 In Re MasterCard tested the DOJ’s theory that the Wire Act 
prohibited all forms of online gambling.53  In that case, a class of gamblers 
sued their creditors to free themselves of debt accrued while gambling 
online.54  The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the debts were the result of 
gambling activity that was illegal under the Wire Act and thus uncollectible 
by creditors.55  District Court Judge Duvall dismissed the case finding that 
“a plain reading of the statutory language clearly requires that the object of 
the gambling be a sporting event or contest.”56  The court probed further 
into the legislative history of the Wire Act, noting that recently proposed 
amendments to the Wire Act sought to expand its coverage to forms of 
gambling beyond sports-betting, including all games of chance.57  The 
judge viewed this as a Congressional admission that the Wire Act was 
indeed limited in scope.58  The Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal.59  While 
circuit courts may disagree on the meaning of any statute, the Fifth Circuit’s 
ruling tremendously weakened the DOJ’s position that all forms of 
gambling were illegal pursuant to the Wire Act. 
¶15 Nevertheless, the DOJ’s aggression and Congress’ persistent push 
for prohibitive legislation succeeded in creating a hostile U.S. terrain.  
There are virtually no e-casinos based in the U.S.,60 and major credit card 
companies and domestic payment processors have voluntarily undertaken to 
block online wagers.61  This was a nominal victory, however, as U.S. 
gamblers are readily served by offshore e-casinos.  Furthermore, in place of 
credit card companies, gamblers turned to e-wallets,62 many of which are 
located and regulated offshore.63 
                                                     
52 Id. 
53 See In Re MasterCard Int’l. Inc., 132 F.Supp.2d 468, 479–481 (E.D. La. 
2001). 
54 Id. at 475. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 480. 
57 Id. 
58 See id. at 480–81. 
59 In Re MasterCard Int’l. Inc., 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002). 
60 Peter J. Scoolidge, Gambling BlindFolded: The Case For a Regulated 
Domain For Gambling Web Sites, 10 GAMING L.REV. 252, 253 (2006). 
61 Id. at 254. 
62 See Clarke, supra note 19. 
63 See Experts on Ban, supra note 3. 
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¶16 Online gambling continued to expand exponentially through 
2005.64  But in 2006, the U.S. took the gambling world by surprise by 
enacting the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”).  
The section that follows analyzes the Act. 
II. THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT 
¶17 Essentially, the UIGEA seeks to cut off the flow of funds from U.S. 
gamblers to e-casinos.65  To that end, it mainly targets two actors: e-casinos 
and financial institutions.  The interplay of sections 5363 and 5366 makes it 
a felony for a person (1) engaged in the business of betting or wagering to 
(2) knowingly accept money (3) in connection with unlawful gambling.66  
The crime is punishable by up to five years in prison.67  Furthermore, 
federal regulators are required to draft regulations designed to compel 
financial institutions to identify and block restricted gambling 
transactions.68  Noncompliant financial institutions are subject to civil 
penalties.69 
¶18 The Act requires gambling to be unlawful under existing federal or 
state law to trigger criminal liability.70  Therefore, the Act’s criminal 
provisions rely on the violation of one or more of the patchwork of existing 
state and federal gambling laws, some of which also require a predicate 
offense.71 
A. Federal Law Triggers of Criminal Liability Under § 5363 
¶19 There are two types of federal laws which would trigger the 
“unlawful gambling” prong of § 5363.  The first does not require a predicate 
offense, while the second does require a predicate offense.  The Wire Act is 
an example of the first type in that it directly prohibits sports betting.  
Comparatively, the Illegal Gambling Act (“IGBA”) and the Travel Act 
require a predicate violation of a separate federal or state law.  Specifically, 
the IGBA makes it a crime to conduct a gambling business that violates 
state law72 and the Travel Act prohibits interstate or overseas travel that 
                                                     
64 See id. 
65 31 U.S.C. §§ 5363, 5366 (2006). 
66 Id.  
67 31 U.S.C. § 5366. 
68 31 U.S.C. § 5364(a). 
69 31 U.S.C. § 5365. 
70 31 U.S.C. § 5363. 
71 Id. 
72 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (2006). 
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furthers the operation of an unlawful business enterprise.73  Similarly, the 
new UIGEA requires such a predicate offense. 
¶20 To illustrate, in U.S. v. BetOnSports, an offshore sports e-casino 
was permanently enjoined from doing business in the U.S.74  By operating a 
sports-gambling business, BetOnSports was in clear violation of the Wire 
Act.75  That violation triggered a Travel Act violation as it rendered 
BetOnSports an “illegal gambling business.”76  Under these facts, the new 
Act would be applied in much the same way; that is, BetOnSports.com 
knowingly accepted bets in connection with sports gambling deemed 
unlawful under the Wire Act.  However, in cases where a gambling business 
is not sports-related, federal law will not trigger the new Act as most of the 
applicable federal laws themselves require a predicate violation.  
Ultimately, satisfying the “unlawful gambling” prong of section 5363 will 
depend principally on state law violations. 
B. State Law triggers of § 5363 
¶21 Where state law clearly prohibits Internet gambling, an offshore e-
casino’s operation would be unlawful under § 5363 of the Act.  While, 
“there are only a handful of states that expressly ban Internet gambling,”77  
all states have general anti-gambling statutes.78  Despite “the presumption 
that [these statutes] do not apply if part of the [gambling] activity takes 
place overseas,”79 courts have found them adequate to prosecute offshore e-
casinos under federal law.80  In theory, the facts in both BetOnSports and 
People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp. would have satisfied the 
“unlawful gambling” prong of § 5363.81 
¶22 The court in BetOnSports concluded that the defendant e-casino had 
violated a Missouri state law which “outlaws gambling and the promotion 
of gambling outside of heavily regulated river boat casinos.”82  That state 
                                                     
73 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006). 
74 See U.S. v. BetOnSports PLC, No. 4:06CV01064 (CEJ) slip op. at 9 (E.D. 
Mo. Nov. 9, 2006). 
75 Id. 
76  See id. 
77 Chuck Humphrey, Internet Gambling Funding Ban, GAMBLING-LAW-US, 
Oct. 13, 2006, http://www.gambling-law-us.com/Federal-Laws/internet-
gambling-ban.htm. 
78 Nelson Rose, Viewpoint: The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 
2006 Analyzed, 10 GAMING L. REV. 537, 538 (2006). 
79 Id. 
80 See, e.g., U.S. v. BetOnSports PLC, No. 4:06CV01064 (CEJ) slip op. at 9 
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 9, 2006). 
81 See id. 
82 Id. 
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law violation further triggered liability under the Illegal Gambling Business 
Act.83  Under similar facts, the state law violation would have provided the 
necessary trigger for the UIGEA. 
¶23 In People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp, the court found an e-
casino in violation of a New York statute that prohibits gambling within 
New York State.  Crucially, the court determined that the location from 
which the online bet was made was where the gambling occurred.84  There, 
the state law violation further invoked the Travel Act, as it would have the 
UIGEA.85 
¶24 One gaming law practitioner believes the analysis in World 
Interactive should be broadened, reasoning that if gambling is said to take 
place on both ends of the Internet connection, then e-casinos are doing 
business in the location from which the players make their bets.86  Thus, the 
e-casino is illegally operating without a license “whether or not the state has 
adopted a specific Internet anti-gambling law.”87  On the other hand, a 
Texas state court explained that “a statute that prohibits recording bets in 
Texas [could not] be used against a gambling business which records bets 
[overseas], even if the bets are called in from Texas.”88  Ultimately, the 
courts have looked closely to the statutory language in deciding whether 
state law was violated, indicating that rulings on the issue would vary across 
the states.89 
1. What about Poker? 
¶25  “Online poker has grown dramatically from $82 million in annual 
revenue in 2000 to over $2 billion in 2005.”90  Neither the Act nor any other 
federal statute explicitly addresses poker.91  The issue of how the Act 
affects Internet poker is important and hinges both on state law and how the 
Act will be interpreted by courts. 
                                                     
83 See id. at 8, 9. 
84 Doyle, supra note 25, at 12. (citing People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 
714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 849 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)). 
85 Id. 
86 See Humphrey, supra note 77. 
87 Id. 
88 Doyle, supra note 25, at 12. (citing United States v. Truesdale, 152 F.3d 443, 
469–449 (5th Cir. 1998)). 
89 See supra Part II.B. 
90 David O. Stewart, An Analysis of Internet Gambling and Its Policy 
Implications, AGA 10th Anniversary White Paper Series, at 3, available at 
http://www.americangaming.org/assets/files/studies/wpaper_internet_0531.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2008). 
91 See Shulman, supra note 13; see also Is Poker in the U.S. a Game of Skill?, 
Gambling-Law-US, http://www.gambling-law-us.com/Articles-Notes/online-
poker-skill.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2008). 
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¶26 Conceptually, there are three types of games.  The first type is 
games of chance, in which all of the variation is determined by chance, such 
as lotteries.  The second type is games of skill, in which none of the 
outcomes are determined by chance, such as chess, checkers and go.  The 
third type is a hybrid of the two, in which skill and chance mix in various 
concentrations, but in most of which the short-run domination by chance 
washes out in the long run, leaving as winners those who are good at 
understanding probability and/or good at deception.  The vast majority of 
state gambling laws covers only games of chance—not games of skill.92  
When confronted with a hybrid, most courts apply the predominance test to 
determine if the game will be treated as one of skill or chance.93  The 
predominance test asks whether skill or chance predominates in determining 
the outcome of a game.94  Whether poker would be deemed skill-dominated 
under the test is uncertain.95  First, it would be implausible to argue that in 
any one hand of poker skill always dominates chance.  Second, the author 
has not identified any studies evaluating the weight that skill has in the 
outcome of any one poker tournament or cash game, or over many 
tournaments or cash games.96  Lastly, only limited case law exists on the 
issue.97  Predictably, many e-casinos maintain that poker is a game of skill, 
implying that their websites are legal in most jurisdictions.98  However, 
“[t]here are some states that do not allow wagering even on games of 
skill.”99 
                                                     
92 See State Gambling Law Summary, Gambling-Law-US, 
http://www.gambling-law-us.com/State-Law-Summary/ (last visited Apr. 12, 
2008) (stating that in jurisdictions where the Dominant Factor Test is applied, 
games of skill generally are permissible). 
93 See Is Poker in the U.S. a Game of Skill?, supra note 91. 
94 Id. 
95 See id. 
96 “The main . . . difference between [cash games and tournaments] is that in 
cash games you can always rebuy but in tournaments each player starts with a 
finite number of chips.”  Annie Duke, Q&A, UltimateBet, 
http://www.annieduke.com/articles.php?articleID=91&section=qa (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2008).  Thus, it is possible in a cash game for a majority of the players 
to win (provided that at least one player loses a lot).  The same is not true for 
tournaments, where usually only the top finishers will be winners.  See id. 
97 See Is Poker in the U.S. a Game of Skill?, supra note 91 (“There have been 
some passing references to poker as a game of skill in a few cases.”). 
98 See, e.g., Poker 4 America, Official Online Poker Room Statements 
Regarding U.S Law, http://www.poker4america.com/Official-Poker-Room-
Statements.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2008) (“PokerStars believes that poker is a 
game of skill enjoyed by millions of players and we remain committed to 
providing [U.S. customers] a safe and fun environment in which to play.”). 
99 See Is Poker in the U.S. a Game of Skill?, supra note 91. 
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¶27 The UIGEA is arguably broad enough to encompass not just games 
of chance but hybrid games in which chance is present, such as poker.  
Recall that § 5363 applies to persons engaged in the “business of betting or 
wagering.”100  The term “bet or wager” is defined as the risking of 
something of value on the outcome of a contest, sports event, or a game 
subject to chance.101  The statute neither provides a definition for, nor 
examples of, a “game subject to chance” and, notably, does not use the 
more popular phrase “game of chance”.102  The former phrasing—game 
subject to chance—is much broader.  Indeed, even games requiring much 
skill are subject to some degree of chance.  In games like blackjack, draw, 
poker, and bridge, the outcome of any single hand is determined 
substantially by chance, but the outcome of a series of repeat iterations 
seems not to be.  Thus, it appears that even games that may be 
predominated by skill would be covered under the Act’s definition of “bet 
or wager.” 
¶28 Furthermore, in the following subparagraph of the Act, betting 
includes “the purchas[ing] of the opportunity to win a lottery that is 
predominantly subject to chance.”103  This language ostensibly endorses the 
predominance test in the case of lotteries.  Congress easily could have 
referred to “games predominantly subject to chance” in its definition of “bet 
or wager.”  Arguably, the term “predominantly” was omitted in an attempt 
to encompass hybrid games.  Therefore, the Act probably covers poker even 
if poker would be deemed a game of skill under the predominance test.  
Perhaps not coincidentally, legislation has been introduced that would 
exempt all “games of skill,” including poker, from liability under any 
federal law.104 
C. No Accepting Bets.  But What About Placing and Transmitting 
Them? 
¶29 The Act’s criminal provision applies only to one who “knowingly 
accepts” a bet, i.e., the e-casino.105  It does not apply to a player who places 
a bet.106  The Act also fails to impose criminal liability on the banks, credit 
card companies, and e-wallets that transmit wagered funds from the bettor 
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to the e-casino.107  These financial intermediaries—collectively referred to 
in the Act as Financial Transactions providers (“FTPs”)108—are further 
unlikely to be convicted of aiding or abetting.109  Professor Nelson Rose 
observes: “For a law designed to stop the flow of money, it is bizarre to 
make it a crime only to receive the funds, but not to send them or transmit 
them.”110 
¶30 Civil action may be brought against FTPs.111  At the time this iBrief 
was written, the Department of Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board 
missed the deadline for drafting regulations requiring FTPs to implement 
policies and procedures to identify and block prohibited transactions.112  
However, once the regulations are in place, both U.S. and offshore FTPs 
must comply with these regulations, or they will be subject to civil 
injunctions.113 
¶31 The forthcoming regulations will not likely have a significant effect 
on major credit card companies, as most already have mechanisms that 
obstruct online gambling transactions.114   The regulations likely will make 
such systems mandatory for all domestic FTPs.115 
¶32 The Act also allows federal regulators to exempt certain 
transactions in consideration of practical limitations.116  For instance, 
requiring banks to analyze “40 billion checks a year would be a largely 
manual process.”117  “If checks are not exempt, this would break banks as it 
would be too costly to enforce.”  But “[i]f checks are exempt, players could 
simply send a check to an online site.”118  Exempting checks may not 
appear to be such a big loophole.  Paper checks are, after all, disfavored 
among bettors due to the hassle of mailing them and waiting for them to 
post to one’s account.  But “[i]f checks are not within the purview of the 
law” it is unclear whether e-checks, which present much less of an obstacle 
than paper checks, will be subject to regulation.119 
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¶33 Furthermore, U.S. gamblers primarily use offshore e-wallets to 
transfer their bets.120  The e-wallet business model makes it difficult for a 
U.S. financial institution to distinguish a gambling transaction from a non-
gambling transaction.121  Thus, it will be left to e-wallets and other offshore 
FTPs to voluntarily comply with U.S. regulations.122  It is very unlikely that 
all offshore financial intermediaries will walk away from a twelve billion 
dollar industry in order to avoid U.S. civil sanctions.123  An obvious 
enforcement alternative would be to create a “blacklist” of noncompliant 
offshore FTPs with which U.S. financial institutions are prohibited from 
engaging in any transaction.124  Such an approach, however, could lead 
down a slippery slope.  One expert asks whether “federal regulators [would] 
then prohibit U.S. banks from sending funds to an overseas bank, which 
forwards the money to [an e-wallet].” 125  Blocking all transactions, lawful 
and unlawful alike, seems a fairly draconian, expensive, and unsustainable 
alternative. 
III. ONLINE GAMBLING POST-ACT 
A. Disparate Pressure on Publicly-Traded Companies 
¶34 The passing of the Act devastated many publicly-traded online-
gambling companies.126  PartyGaming, “which rake[d] in nearly $4 million 
a day from its 19 million customers, fell 57 percent . . . .  Sportingbet, 
which owns sportsbook.com and ParadisePoker.com, lost 60 percent[;] 888 
was down 33 percent[;] and Austria's bwin.com fell 24 percent.”127  Ever 
beholden to their shareholders, publicly-traded e-casinos stopped serving 
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U.S. customers after the Act was passed.128  Many perceived the Act as a 
clear proclamation that online gambling was now prohibited.129  Still, some 
questioned whether the Act had real teeth.130  The abrupt withdrawal of 
public companies freed up market share which was subsequently seized by 
privately-held e-casinos that do not answer to shareholders and thus could  
afford to test the Act’s true bite.131 
¶35 Additionally, after the Act passed, NETeller, the most widely-used 
publicly-traded e-wallet, continued serving U.S. customers.132  The DOJ 
later arrested two of its retired founders in the U.S. Virgin Islands on money 
laundering charges related to NETeller’s role in facilitating online 
wagers.133  Shortly after the arrests, NETeller pulled out of the U.S. market 
and later settled charges with the DOJ, 134 but not before it’s stock price 
plummeted.135  E-casino websites have since been directing their U.S. 
patrons to use e-passporte.com, a privately-held e-wallet, since publicly-
traded e-wallets are no longer available.136  Other privately-owned e-wallets 
have emerged in response to NETeller’s withdrawal.137 
¶36 After all of this, the Act and the DOJ’s efforts may not have even 
slowed down online gambling in the U.S.138  Even if an overall decline in 
online gambling can be shown, it still would not follow that those who are 
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in need of protection the most—underage and problem gamblers—were 
impeded.  The consequence has been to deny gamers the preferred services 
of publicly-traded e-casinos and e-wallets.139  A couple of questions follow:  
What will be the practical effect of this shift in the major players?  And 
what impact will it have on U.S. policy concerns? 
B. The Replacement of Publicly-Traded Companies with Privately-
Owned e-Casinos Undermines U.S. Policy Objectives. 
¶37 Approximately eighty countries regulate online gambling.140  
“Many of the world’s largest [e-casinos] are listed on the London Stock 
Exchange or the Alternative Investment Market.”141  In 2005, the U.K. 
established the Gambling Commission as part of an aggressive reform of its 
gambling regulations.142  The Gambling Commission has the primary 
objectives of keeping crime and corruption out of gambling, ensuring 
gambling activities are offered in a fair environment, providing information 
and support to problem gamblers and preventing underage gambling.143  
Other countries, including Australia, regulate online gambling and require 
e-casinos to implement similar protections for consumers.144 
¶38 In contrast, most privately-owned e-casinos are not subject to 
comparable oversight.  In a study conducted by the U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 56% of e-casinos failed to list a licensing country on 
their websites and 62% failed to list a contact location.145  Congressman 
Bob Goodlatte, a long-time proponent of Internet gambling prohibition, 
emphasized that “these offshore, fly-by-night Internet gambling operators 
are unlicensed, untaxed and unregulated . . . .”146  It is ironic then, that the 
practical effect of U.S. policy has been to increase market share for these 
unregulated e-casinos, which are potentially more harmful than their 
publicly-traded and regulated counterparts. 
¶39 Public e-wallets have similarly been replaced with private e-wallets 
which can be dangerous to consumers.  According to one expert, “[t]here 
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are always third-party processors popping up that are really fly-by-nights . . 
. [T]hese are small companies in Central America, Latin America, and even 
the Middle East.” 147  In several cases, e-wallets have operated for a few 
months and suddenly disappeared with the casinos’ and players’ money . . . 
.”148  Further, these unregulated entities have little, if any, incentive to incur 
the costs of implementing consumer safeguards, which are imposed on 
regulated companies.  Arguably, the lack of security resulting from pushing 
the industry further underground may discourage some would-be gamblers 
from internet gambling.  But, on balance, internet gambling in the U.S. will 
most likely continue to thrive. 
¶40 The market may distinguish and reward foreign unregulated 
companies that voluntarily undertake consumer protection measures.149  
However, empirical evidence supports the general proposition that foreign 
companies will be less compliant with domestic law than domestic 
companies.150  Furthermore, privately-held companies generally will be less 
transparent and regulated than publicly-traded companies.151  Arguably, 
even if private e-casinos instituted consumer safeguards, publicly-traded 
domestically-based companies are preferable.  The U.S. has taken this 
option off the table for American gamblers and, in so doing, has increased 
their exposure to the very dangers it purports to address. 
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FURTHER OBSERVATIONS:  WHERE TO GO FROM HERE? 
 In light of U.S. policy concerns, what are the viable alternatives?  
While a comprehensive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this 
iBrief, the author recommends that the U.S. follow the examples of the 
U.K., Australia and other developed nations and regulate online gambling in 
a manner that can address legitimate public policy concerns while 
remaining enforceable and manageable.  Commentators have suggested 
alternative regulatory frameworks. 
 Some commentators vie for intrastate regulation:152
The state could protect its citizens by requiring that online gambling 
businesses operate honestly according to that state’s rules.  State 
regulation would include social protections, such as enforcing 
standards against underage gambling, requiring mechanisms such as 
loss limits that gamblers could use to control their gambling, and 
mandating the delivery of responsible gaming information to online 
players. 
¶41 In addition to promoting responsible online gambling, states could 
tax gambling and create jobs, keeping gambling dollars within the U.S."153 
¶42 Others point out that “the Internet is uniquely a creature of 
interstate commerce”154 and thus federal regulation might be a better 
approach.  Recently, law-makers have proposed legislation in support of 
both intrastate and interstate regulation.155  Yet, although lobbyists and 
legislators have mobilized to push for regulation, the U.S. is trending 
toward prohibition.156 
¶43 Arguably, flat bans have a tendency to produce dangerous black 
markets.157  Thus, it can be argued that regulation is usually a desirable 
alternative.  But does this viewpoint justify legalizing cocaine or child 
pornography?  No doubt, the line must be drawn somewhere.  While this 
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issue is beyond the scope of this iBrief, the author would make a couple of 
observations.  First, U.S. law regarding cocaine trafficking and child 
pornography is unequivocal: these activities are deemed unacceptable and 
are, correspondingly, illegal across the board.  Second, U.S. policy on 
gambling has been ambivalent, at best.  A moral argument against online 
gambling will not be persuasive as long as there remains no meaningful 
distinction between forms of gambling deemed lawful (e.g. horseracing, 
state lotteries, fantasy football, credit swap defaults) and those deemed 
unlawful (e.g., dog-racing, sports-betting).  Second, the tangible character 
of drugs makes effective enforcement within U.S. borders a practical 
possibility.  The Internet, on the other hand, eludes such enforcement due to 
the lack of physical national borders and, accordingly, makes attempting to 
ban online gambling akin to clutching a handful of fine sand. 
CONCLUSION 
¶44 U.S. gamblers have demonstrated that they will continue gambling 
online.158  Neither the Act nor the DOJ have effectively addressed the 
dangers of online gambling.159  On the contrary, the U.S. has forced 
transparent and regulated publicly-traded companies out of the market, only 
to be replaced by more opaque and potentially unscrupulous privately-held 
companies.160  In so doing, the U.S. has amplified the risks of consumer 
abuse, underage gambling, problem gambling and money laundering.  
Furthermore, other governments have demonstrated that regulating online 
gambling is a workable alternative.161  It should not take another Prohibition 
for the U.S. to realize what many countries already have:  Regulation is the 
better option. 
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